Journal of Defense Studies & Resource Management

Review Article

Countering Threat Networks in Nigeria's Geopolitical Sphere: The Libyan Vacuum, and Cultural Intelligence as a Panacea

Ibili Celestine N[*]

Abstract

Libya vacuum serves as a safe haven for threat network in the Maghreb down to the Sahel, its geopolitical importance has meant that such instability can be identified as the major causes of the humanitarian crisis in Europe as regards the high level of illegal migrant movement to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. West African region has had its fair share of the Libyan crisis, which has been the vehicle driving the proliferation of light arms and weapons in the region. Nigerian Boko haram terror group has been a major beneficiary of the political instability in the region, though the primary cause of the insurgency is principally linked to the political dynamics of the Nigerian state, the Libyan instability serves as a force multiplier in continuum, it has aided in regrouping, recruiting, acquisition of weapon systems, training of terror combatants, and compartmentalization of clandestine cellular serial terror groups. From a national security point of view, it becomes imperative for Nigerian national security decision-makers to appraise the challenges posed by the Libyan crisis, and the cultural effect of terror groups who uses Nilo-Sahelian culture as a means of designing force compartmentalization, recruitment. In a nutshell, the importance of cultural intelligence in intelligence gathering and combat outcome is the centerpiece of this research article. The cultural context of threat-network activities is very important in designing counter-threat network operations, as a subset of counter-insurgency operation, which by essence is a cultural war. This article concludes that cultural intelligence is imperative at all spectrums of military operations in 21st-century fourth-generation warfare.

Keywords

Geopolitical; Crisis; Migrant; Weapon

Introduction

Libya's political and social stability is of humanitarian, geopolitical, and geostrategic importance to regional and international security, particularly for West African states, the European Union, and the International Community. The Libya vacuum has created a force base geo-socio-political structure where state and non-state actors are in a contest for a dominant narrative and high-political control of the region [1]. The various non-state actors' application of force tends to

create a religious-based nuclear socio-political reality, while regional state actors want to maintain the status quo. What can be discern from the gamut of high political contestation involving international, regional, local non-state threat network versus international and regional states military forces is that none of these players have the adequate military capability to easily implement policy choice and in turn determine a preferred military outcome. Because the geopolitical instability of the Maghreb and Sahel is linked to the political instability in Libya, the fragility of Libya political system and the lack of sovereign territorial integrity of the Libyan state amplify the safe haven and flexibility of threat network operations in the region.

The violent death of Qaddafi and end to his regime brought about an end to a fractured security structure that had been the pillar of some relative peace and stability to Libya, and regional states, like Mali, Niger, and to some lesser extent southern Algeria. The end of his regime gave way to, a new swathe of volatility and insecurity characterized by fractured, compromised, or failed states which now define the nature of security in the Sahelian region, giving greater opportunities to militias, terrorists, and criminal mafia gangs, whose activities undermines a return to a more stable states and societies [1,2].

Moreover, bringing stability to Libya may be a better policy choice of action, but a very difficult one. From a national security point of view, what is required of Nigeria's national security policymakers is to demand a presentation of national intelligence estimate of the threat posed by violence non-state actors from Sahel, Maghreb, to the Lake Chad Basin. The national intelligence estimate which by nature is a holistic threat reported is significant in conducting a total army analysis, by which a gap in military capabilities can be identified, and resources assigned for capability development, force designed, and operations assigned' force to deal with the various functional threats.

United Nations (UN) report attested to the regional threat posed and necessitated by the Libyan civil war, and it juxtaposed that the weapons from Gaddafi's cache had been smuggled through the Sahel, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Such weapons were already in a stockpile of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

It should be worthy of note that the origin of the Boko haram insurgency and terrorism is not primarily linked to regional instability, but was a product of internal political dynamics of the Nigerian state. However, regional instability has had a force multiplier effect on the ability of the group to regroup, recruit, acquire military capabilities, logistics, conduct intelligence operations, absorb casualties and avoid casualties through compartmentalization of forces and leadership structures in the ungoverned territories of the Maghreb, Sahel, and the Lake Chad respectively [3].

Insecurity in the Maghreb, Sahel, and the Lake Chad is geo-strategically linked to insecurity in Nigeria, and must, therefore, be considered a national priority. The Maghreb, Sahel, and Lake Chad' cultural and border behavior shape regional force multiplier of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria's northeast. The recent quantitative and qualitative increase in Boko haram battlefield metric is a perfect example to cite. The strategic and operational question that should be asked and as well as responded to, is how do we contain the linkages or transform the interaction from these various regional connectors to positive interaction, beneficial to national security? This question can be addressed in various ways, which includes: political,

*Corresponding author: Ibili Celestine N, Department of Political Science and Master of Diplomacy and Strategic Studies, Nigeria, E-mail: Celestine.bobo@yahoo.com

diplomatic, military, economics, intelligence, and culture, etc. this article will respond to the above national security question through cultural provision of military required intelligent and cover, as a context; primarily, because other factors can become very effective under cultural cover, and culture is militarily imperative. Therefore the main focus of this article is to contribute to neglected areas in intelligence and military operation. The focus is on the area of cultural intelligence (which can be derived by the mixture use of cultural diplomacy, strategic culture analysis, and human terrain analysis), and the effect of cultural factor, which is a dimensionless element of combat power relations, in battle outcome [3,4]. The very reason the author embark on this research write up is due to the fact that the area of the influence of culture on intelligence and military operations, with an important effect on intelligence operations, force planning, and combat outcome prerequisite are been neglected by the defense and intelligence research community. However, it is imperative to note that this research avoids responding to conceptual definitions and explanation of the aforementioned terms, thereby contributing to the limitation of the research. in the introduction the author stated the regional and international effect of Libya's failed state security (international and regional), he, however, made it clear that Libyan crisis wasn't the origin of Boko haram threat to Nigerian national security and regional stability, but that such is generic to Nigeria's political dynamics, the article went further, to present the cultural context of cultural imperative in military affairs especially in the area of intelligence and military operations, and in another sub-content analyzed the effect of human terrain on intelligence gathering, emphasis was on the fact that counter-insurgency to which counter-threat-network is an element of, is a cultural warfare, in pursuit of popular control of the people, through the process of confidence building, the last sub-content, focused on the effect on culture as a dimensionless element of relative combat power index value, by which every other thing been equal define battle outcome. The article, therefore, concludes that cultural intelligence of a given area of operation and interest is imperatively important in winning the war against terrorist threat-networks [5].

Cultural Context

Cultural Intelligence (CQ) is an innovative, research-based method for functioning meritoriously across national, ethnic and organizational cultures. The most important thing about cultural intelligence is that anybody can develop culturally intelligent abilities [4].

Nigerian application of military force in dealing with Boko haram threat in the northeast, Lake Chad, Sahel, Maghreb (the Author is not certain Nigeria have a military deployment for counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel, and the Maghreb) are insufficient, Nigeria have not adequately applied her soft power heritage in advancing interest in the Sahel, and Lake Chad regions. The threat posed by violence non-state actors to the national security of Nigeria, with its regional implication is an unconventional threat which demands unconventional strategic, operational, and tactical response through influence and infiltration of regional civil societies for the purpose of gathering actionable HUMINT and utilizing geospatial and remote sensing of geographic component threat network tracking, tagging, collecting, and targeting of disperse mobile terror command and control (C2), and serial terror cell's direct action groups. The fusion of cultural diplomacy and strategic culture and human terrain assessment of foreign nation's human terrain is critical in creating strategic assets

and proxy to serve as an enabler for human intelligence gathering (HUMINT), counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and the employment of military strike force for cross-border operations. Cultural relation with civil societies, therefore, overcomes the quandary of geography and juridical territorial limitations in a covert manner.

The strategic leverage of culture for professional soldiers in the war against the army of martyrs (martyrdom doctrine of war) cannot be overemphasis in the area of intelligence, strategic, operational, and tactical maneuver. The creation of Hausa, Kanuri, Yoruba, and Igbo cultural centers in our various neighbouring countries, and staffed by our intelligence personnel, means that in time of crisis with states, or violence non-state actors this cultural groups and individual within, will be of strategic importance in defending our interest and providing valuable intelligence in counter-threats operations, and the prediction of intents [6].

Since suicidal terrorism as a social component of power and weapon of war takes advantage of human want to be a member of a collection, and the individual willingness to make sacrifices of his needs in order to remain a member of such groups and ensures its survival, which is necessary to satisfy man's companionable needs. In other words, a suicidal is influenced to feel obliged to sacrifice his/her life as a need to preserve the security of societal, and community value under threat by an out-group perceived the bellicose course of action. Cultural societies, therefore, will be a valuable asset for the state's countermeasure, and unconventional counter-threat.

In applying cultural interaction between Nigerian diplomatic mission and societies that share cultural heritage with her civil societies, it becomes possible to influence neighboring communities to have a positive view about the country, its people, and support her military missions with credible and actionable intelligence and other intangible capabilities, and also support her regional policies. In a nutshell, "cultural diplomacy enhances cross-cultural communication, improve one's intelligence capabilities, and understand foreign friends and adversaries, their intentions and their capabilities [7]. Cultural diplomacy may also involve efforts to counter hostile foreign cultural diplomacy at home and abroad".

Consequently, operational design and art must be cultural sensitive beyond the passive demographic mapping and analysis of cultural groups in the context of mission analysis and course of action development and analysis, but must consider cultural groups as an interest group with capabilities at their disposal to either aid or undermine friendly forces strategic and operational objectives respectively. Understanding the interaction amongst groups and their perception about friendly or enemy's forces course of actions will give a headway in analyzing whether the local population is been hostile to friendly force or enemy's force as a third force in the battlefield [8]. In a nutshell, been culturally sensitive means creating a specialty within the intelligence planning group to aid in regional and local culture expertise in the modelling of the non-linear factors that affect military operations at all level of war using any appropriate modeling measure, for example, agent-based modelling and simulation, and other techniques to enhance a better understanding of the complex threats embedded in the battlefield, and equally aid in comprehending the enemy's and other forces centre of gravity, critical vulnerabilities etc. "ABM supports the exploration of SA/SU by allowing each agent an idiosyncratic, perception-based view of the environment, rather than the simulation "god-eye" view of ground truth. Using ABM further supports the view of small unit operations as CAS-dynamically

interacting open systems, characterized by "with non-linear and chaotic behaviors".

Today's battles are no longer a linear social event, but the non-linear and complex contesting course of actions by multiple interest groups within a giving civilian population' mindful of its interest in the process of battle and powerful enough to shape the outcomes of the war.

The intellectual appraisal of cultural effect of the population in the battlefield as a third force will be a significant and important information to the joint force command of the geopolitical theater command on how best to tailored the operational art; which by essence is the application of several segmented tactical combat power, and non-lethal civil actions simultaneously in a non-linear responds to threats, in order to achieve the set out strategic objectives for which the operational art is designed.

Cultural appraisal by human terrain analytical team contributes to the effective deployment of information operations in support of decisive defensive and offensive operations by winning over the populace. This aspect of strategic and tactical intelligence mission incorporates important legitimate decision-makers in the process of building an atmosphere of understanding between troops and the local populace, it could also go far as to incorporate local element into aggressive long-range reconnaissance execution, etc. therefore, operational planners for geostrategic deployment of military force for foreign military missions must amongst other thing consider every war of foreign relations as primarily a cultural war. In a nutshell, understanding enemy force and the local population as cultural bearer goes a long way in conducting information operation that denies the enemy the advantage accrued to it by being a member of the cultural population's in-group. Being a member of the larger population's in-group gives violence non-state actor operational security desired in planning cellular compartmentalization of direct and indirect group forces responsible of deploying the insurgent tactical missions that aim at creating tension and distrust between government, friendly forces and the population, a mistrust that could further weaponized the population to organize itself and serve as a third force against friendly forces strategic, operational, and tactical mission task.

Human Terrain System and the Conduct of Intelligence Collection

Culture has been utilized by violence non-state actors and threat network as a military capability in the area of intelligence, force recruitment, and operational planning. "Boko Haram's membership comprises university lecturers, bankers, political elites, drug addicts, unemployed graduates, almajiris, and migrants from neighboring countries. Members are drawn primarily from the Kanuri tribe, which makes up roughly 4% of the Nigerian population, and is concentrated in the north-eastern states of Nigeria, including Bauchi and Borno, as well as from the Hausa-Fulani 29% of the population, who are spread throughout most of the northern states" [7].

Cross-border terrorist activities have proven to be difficult to contain by neighboring states with shared tribes (the overlapping geographic and demographic cluster of the Nilo-Saharan lingual cultural groups, which has the Kanuri language as a lingual and cultural in-group) that provides Boko Haram terrorist sanctuaries in its tribal areas of the Nilo-Saharan geographic habitation. Therefore, culturally embedded strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence will be a great force multiplier and enabler of cross-boundary military'

detection, analysis, identification, decision, and targeting of hostile forces in a geographic component scale that takes into consideration the obliteration of largely dispersed and culturally embedded enemy's forces' command and controls. Consequently, the adoption of human terrain systemic assisted all sourced intelligence gathering and collection mechanism in military intelligence preparation of the battlefield and the operating environment for the active military mission in an ungoverned and complex terrain is crucial in winning the war against Boko Haram terrorist activities and undermine its cross-border activities.

Moreover, conventional intelligence collection and analysis often neglect the area of socio-cultural impact on enemy's force structure, organization, and planning, whose understanding is imperative in the implementation of creative and flexible application of means. Strategic planners, often and falsely separate the enemy forces from the cultural population, thereby neglecting the fact that the enemy been a cultural in-group is a cultural power bearer that can conduct intelligence activities, logistics, and force planning with cultural levers. Socio-cultural influences have not been considering a great deal of force multiplier within the military doctrine and intelligence collection, even though, the current pattern of fourth-generation warfare makes it imperative that counterinsurgency operations should be considered a cultural war. Today's insurgency's operational art and designs are culturally imbedded in all ramifications, and in a way not understood by intelligence analyst, and force planners. This very cultural embedded phenomenon has by necessity alters the military environment, therefore, the new strategic environment demand for strategic engagement, with focus on the development of cultural intelligence capabilities, and military fighting force that is culturally sensitive in all areas of military engagement, especially at the level of tactical combat engagement.

"Conducting military operations in a low-intensity conflict without ethnographic and cultural intelligence is like building a house without using your thumbs: it is a wasteful, clumsy, and unnecessarily slow process at best, with a high probability for frustration and failure. But while waste on a building site means merely loss of time and materials, waste on the battlefield means loss of life, both civilian and military, with high potential for failure having grave geopolitical consequences to the loser".

Terrorist combat power is a mixture of hardware and socio-culturally constructed force strength embodied in the interaction between terror groups and their community. One way by which terrorism can be mitigated is by understanding its sociological construction of power within its existing community, and the influence of ideology in target selection, the overall of these forms, and shapes terrorists policies, and its adequate appraisal could lead to understanding terrorists serial threat network operational design, and such could also be obliterated through geostrategic continuous clandestine tracking and targeting. Therefore, pertinent to say that terror threat network center of gravity lay in the way its ideology influences it targets in response to mobilizing support from its community. In a nutshell, the terrorist center of gravity lay secretly in its community.

Belligerent policies are always influenced by culture, policy imposes constraint, and constraint indicate patterns, therefore it is the duty of intelligence and military planners to understand terrorist decision making and target selection as informed by the cultural and ideological constraint which dictate patterns and mode of operation. The kidnapping of school girls in Nigeria by Boko Haram terrorist is a

potent example of ideological and cultural constraint. It is acceptable to carry-out such an act since the girl child education is an aberration to the jihadist interpretation of sharia, which a segment of the Northeast Population and the Nilo-Saharan Islamic communities adhered to. In a nutshell, terrorists situate target selection and acquisition based on ideological and cultural preferences. Also, the terrorist deployment of suicide bombing through improvising explosive devices, are of strategic importance to their mission and objectives, in that such tactical weapon of warfare serves a strategic goal, and has a universal psychological impact on the psyche of the nation, the global community, and equally appease it base Therefore counter-terrorism planning must take into consideration culturally-induced patterns of terror attack and develop adequate operational and tactical strategy to out-maneuver the terror forces in terms of disrupting their activities, capacity to plan an attack, and unleashing any of such lethality in the area of operation.

One of the best ways to deploy area denial strategy, which imposes unacceptable cost on terror activities in a theater of war, is to initiate a sound culturally infiltrated HUMINT collection mechanism that aids geostrategic continuous clandestine tracking and targeting of terror threat networks, through culturally sensitive counter-finance, counter-improvise explosive devices, and tracking and acquisition of high value targets in highly populated cross-border tribes, which are used as a sanctuary by threat network.

Cultural intelligence, which is facilitated through the implementation of cultural diplomatic relation between Nigeria's neighbouring states and their communities fused with a modified target system analysis and counter-terrorism analytical framework, and staffed with special culturally-sensitive terrorist tracking taskforce made-up of social-science [9] skilled military and security personals drawn from various security and intelligence institutions, and linked up with the theatre air/ground combat systems and component forces for a non-delayed force obliteration of identified hostiles is key in winning the war on terror.

Also advancing the publicity that terrorism is a threat to community security and values through civil relations, serves as a deterrent against terrorist popularity within the area of operation and interest. "A new post-9/11 consensuses that terrorism violates the principles of the international community is emerging among states. Expanding this international norm to the aggrieved populations that terrorists claim to represent is a crucial component in the war on terrorism".

In a nutshell, Targeting Officers responsible for gathering intelligence for the purpose of appropriate military/strategic planning of the national security environment are therefore saddled with the responsibility of having cultural understanding of the area of operation and interest (North-east, Maghreb, and the Lake Chad Basin) so as to disrupt the various activities of such actors, through counter-intelligence, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations. In other words, the state's intelligence apparatus must be able to equip policymakers and military commanders with the appropriate appraisal of the required intelligence about the counter-insurgency environment. This is done by means of having an efficient cultural intelligence. Counter-insurgency is more of an intelligence war, more importantly at the cultural level; this is primarily because of the organizational nature and operational art of the insurgencies. Counter-intelligence operation while paying critical attention at the analysis of the enemy courses of action, must also put into consideration the socio-cultural factors that are likely to affect counter-insurgents operations (positive, or negative). The insurgencies not only hide among the people but also

desires and strive to win over the people. Therefore, the combatant commander's critical information requirement must include the effect of socio-cultural factors on the theatre of operation. In the final analysis, socio-factors should be a high priority information required for the deployment of a national asset to the area of operation, just as the assessment of the enemy's course of action.

Cultural Influence on Battle Outcome

The first truism of war and its series of coordinated battles, which defined its essential character is that it's prone with casualties from both opposing sides, though the relation of casualties from both sides are mostly unequal, and the ability to continue combat is subject to the effect of battle damage to relative combat power effectiveness. The ability to attain mission task is dependent on the ability to absorb casualties and inflict injuries. However, the differing character of battle damage effect from armored, to dispatch and mechanized infantry are significant in analyzing battle. The influence of these casualties on the ability of the survivors to continue to fight has long been a subject of interest, with little research carried out on the subject matter. The ability of Isil to assimilate, absorb, and respond to the effect of American network-centric warfighting offensive and defensive combat fires (through combat experience and lesson learned) gives it advantage in fighting and exploiting the battlefield operational/environmental factors against a non-network centric combine arm force [9]. Therefore Isil brings a new metric to bear in Boko haram combat engagement with Nigerian tactical combat unit. In a nutshell, having been able to experience through combat, the application of increased lethality from network-centric weapon systems, and had consequently restructured friendly forces to absorb lethality and equally respond with firepower, and much casualties based on lesson learned, the result of combat engagement will not only reflect lethality overmatch, but also on how command and control adopt flexibility in the application of tactics, techniques, and procedures in doing battle for the primary purpose of mission accomplishment. In this case, analysis of combat outcome cannot focus singularly on lethality as a major determinant of success and failure; logistics, and other dimensionless factors, like culture, must be put into consideration. "The first issue with conventional concepts of military power is that they overlook culture and its influence on warfare".

However, some cultural factors, which are characteristically and phenomenally dimensionless, are either force multipliers or hindrances to battle outcomes. The Nigerian army must be oriented towards operating its forces in an environment shaped by these cultures. Culture is an operational/environmental factor in the analysis of relative combat power value [10].

While superiority in numbers of troops and equipment has remained a strong factor for battlefield outcome in historical perspective, the human dimensionless element of warfare, of which leadership, morale, and surprise, are some of the examples have remained critical determinants of battle outcome in spite of the technological improvement in weapons lethality effectiveness

Therefore, Nigerian military, been currently engaged in asymmetric warfare with the Boko haram' al-Qaida and Isil linked Islamic jihadist in the northeastern part of the country with its geographic and geo-social linked with other countries' ungoverned territory defining the battlefield geometry must consider the effect of culture in battle outcome in a battlefield shaped by culture. Because this very nature of the battlefield has been identified as a major factor or reason why

Nigerian combat units have been losing combat engagement with Boko haram fighters, it is therefore pertinent to analyse the dynamic effect of culture on the possible outcome of battle, in a way that helps analyst and force planners appreciate the holistic effect of culture in all ramification of military affairs and maneuver operations [11].

The analysis of wars and combats have been historically based on qualitative and quantitative conjecture, broadly speaking, military and civilian analyst have utilized mathematical, historical, and sociological methodologies in analyzing war from a political, strategic, operational, and tactical perspective. These methodologies, with their various shortfalls, have contributed to reshaping strategy and re-evaluating combat power in the course of future wars. Therefore it is pertinent that scholars and military planners employ a sociological discussion of culture to evaluate combat power and relative combat power effectiveness as a part, sine qua non to victory in any particular battle.

The neglect of culture, a dimensionless, intangible, complex, and critical element of combat power has had an adverse effect on the battle outcome. Thus the analysis of combat power is mostly over quantified, and equally relating to partial estimation of ones force's capabilities and the underestimation of enemy's force capabilities by decision-makers, force planners, and combat commanders. Furthermore, the series of coordinated battles against Boko haram terrorist been more influenced by the Nilo-Saharan cultural complex makes it imperative to analyze how it affects Nigeria's allies martial commitment on operational and tactical engagement with the violent non-state actors, and how they conceive what amount to strategic interest. In addition, since combat power effectiveness is a product of material, and quality of troops amongst other things, it is imperative to have knowledge on how societal trait and cultural generation of value may affect groups, and individual's combatant behavior in combat against a belligerence group (violence non-state actors, e.g. Boko Haram), with shared world view on competing cultural context, which may be the underlying narrative that drives a protracted conflict. Culture as an inherent element of military force and a binding factor that brings about individual and group combat effectiveness in unit-level lethal and civil affairs engagement with enemy forces in an area of operations is important, if military operation is to be successful in the application of maneuvers to overwhelm the operational environment inherent complexity that could undermine its ability to function as individuals or a unit, and freely employ freedom of action. In a nutshell, culture is critical for commander's appraiser of own forces relative combat power effectiveness, and friendly or allied combat unit martial commitment.

Forces with cultural leverages in the area of operations exert more casualty on their enemy by synchronizing lethality with cultural appearances by disguising (application of deceptive tactics) as civilians to infiltrate enemy's force concentrations and undermines its field security through the employment of suicide bombing, which is often a precursor to combat engagement. Such disruptive tactical measure always has an adverse effect against an institutionally, technically, and economically superior force relative combat power, and in some cases undermine its ability to continue battle amidst too many casualties. Culture is, therefore, a battle-benefitting quality that must be possessed relative to enemy forces, and as an operational and environmental requirement.

To avoid losing combat to Boko haram forces, operational planners must through civil consideration or human terrain mission planning ensure that Nilo-Saharan cultural appeals to Salafist militant jihad does not have a prevailing influence in the geographic operational area of combat, nor does it serves as a terror means of intelligence gathering through recruitment of vulnerable individual members of own forces combat unit, etc. The cultural implication to battle outcome is such that it demands a national policy consideration.

Conclusion

The Libyan crisis and instability has informed the importance of cultural imperative in all ramification of Nigeria's geopolitics, thereby demanding that geostrategic engagement in her geo-social sphere of interest in the Nilo-Saharan cultural linkages take cultural intelligence serious, and as such could be facilitated through military human terrain analysis and capability build-up, cultural diplomacy facilitation of infiltration and mutual relation and understanding with neighbouring states civil societies, strategic culture's strategic assessments of foreign nations interest in regional high political realities. With consideration to the undeniable fact that counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency to which counter-threat-network is a subset and important element of, is cultural warfare, it will be of strategic importance to ensure that combat warriors are culturally sensitive to the operating environment in other not to be disadvantaged at the dimensionless factor of relative combat power value. Therefore training strategic, operational, and tactical commanders and warriors on how to operate in a culture influenced the environment through the development of course of actions that are not ant-ethical to the understanding of the populace is sine quo non to winning over the people and undermining the terrorist culturally embedded operational art.

International efforts to control the flow of funds to classified 'terrorist groups' via the formal financial system is a well-orchestrated effort at the multinational level. However, despite the strong participation of willing states and international banks to undermine terrorist attacks and financing, it remains difficult to determine how these efforts have yielded in undermining terrorist financing. "Financial intelligence efforts have had a little externally discernible impact on reducing levels of terrorism or on criminal convictions"

Therefore, counter-threat finance, counter-improvised explosives, and continuous clandestine tracking and targeting of terrorist groups and their various threatening activities must be of cultural consideration, by understanding local financial transaction patterns, family and social bonds, which terrorist can utilize in compartmentalizing logistic, leadership, and other nefarious activities that are inimical to national security. Furthermore, since terror group takes advantage of the community and cultural affiliations to infiltrate national forces intelligence organizations, it will be of urgent importance to put culture into consideration in the vetting of intelligence officers in a manner that doesn't sound or involve ethnic and religious profiling.

This article, therefore, concludes from a strong intellectual standpoint that cultural effect on both intelligence gathering and combat performance are a critical strategic requirement to countering the threat posed by violence non-state actors. Nigerian strategic and military planners must put culture into consideration in force planning and operational design; this would be a game-changer in the war against terrorism and other forms of insecurities, which now bedevils Nigerian state in the 21st century.

References

1. Larémont RR (2013) After the fall of qaddafi: Political, economic, and security consequences for libya, mali, niger, and algeria. Int J Security Develop 2: 1-8.
2. Basar E (2012) Libya's dilemma: Dependency on militias and reintegration efforts. Norfolk: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre.
3. Livermore D, Dyne LV (2015) Cultural intelligence: The essential intelligence for the 21st century. The SHRM Foundation.
4. Ivey B, Cleggett P (2008) Cultural diplomacy and the national interest: In search of a 21st-century perspective. The Curb Center for Art, Enterprise and Public Policy.
5. Middleton VE (2010) Simulating small unit military operations with agent-based model of complex adaptive systems. IEEE: Proceedings of the 2010 Winter Simulation Conference.
6. Agbiboa DE (2013) The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state. Stability: Int J Security Develop 2: 52.
7. Kipp J, Grau K, Prinslow K, Smith D (2006) The human terrain system: A cords for the 21st century. Military Review.
8. Steven S, Jeff M (2004) Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda its popular support. The Washington Quarterly 28: 129-145.
9. Fowler ES (2016) Culture and military effectiveness: How societal traits influence battle outcomes. Graduate Program in International Studies Theses and Dissertations Paper.
10. Rotte R, Schmidt C (2003) On the production of victory: Empirical determinants of battlefield success in modern war. Def Peace Econ 14: 175-192
11. Levi M, Karstedt S, Ruggiero V (2010) Combating the financing of terrorism: A history and assessment of the control of Threat finance. British J Crimin 50: 650-669.

Author Affiliation   Top

Department of Political Science and Master of Diplomacy and Strategic Studies, Nigeria